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The action of the School Board in San Francisco in
requiring the Japanese residents of that city, who desire
to educate their children in the public schools, to send
them to the separate school provided by the authorities
for the education of the children of Mongolian parents,
raises an interesting question of the proper interpreta-
tion of the yights conferred upon Japanese residents by
our Treaty with Japan. The action may also raise the
question of the extent of the treaty-making power con-
ferred by the Constitution on the Federal Government.
The first Article of our treaty of Commerce and
Navigation with Japan, the treaty of 1894, provides:
"The citizens or subjects of each of the two high contracting parties
shall have full liberty to enter, travel or reside in any part of the ter-
ritories of the other contracting party. * *
"In whatever relates to rights of residence and travel * * * the
citizens or subjects of each contracting party shall enjoy in the ter-
ritories of the other the same privileges, liberties and rights, and shall
be subject to no higher imposts or charges in these respects than native
citizens or subjects or citizens or subjects of the most favored nation."
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The last clause of the second Article is as follows:
"It is, however, understood, that the stipulations contained in this
and the preceding Article do not in any way affect the laws, ordin-
ances and regulations with regard to * * * police and public
security which are in force or which may hereafter be enacted in either
of the two countries."
In regard to the proper construction of this Treaty as
applied to the action of the San Francisco School Board,
several questions arise.
Is the right of the inhabitants of San Francisco to have
their children attend the public schools a right of "resi-
dence" within the meaning of that word as used in the
Treaty?
Does the San Francisco School Board deny to Japanese
residents the same "privileges, liberties and rights" of
public school education, as it gives to her own citizens
or the citizens of other countries, being residents of San
Francisco, by requiring Japanese residents to send their
children to a separate school?
This question may be affected by the location of and
accommodation in the separate Mongolian school of San
Francisco. We understand that there is but one Mon-
golian public school in the city.
If it should be decided that, within the meaning of the
Treaty, a right to attend a public school is a right of resi-
dence, and that the action of the San Francisco School
Board is a denial of "the same privileges, liberties and
rights" in respect to public school education which are
granted to other residents, the question would remain,
whether the act of the San Francisco authorities could be
justified under the clause which excepts "laws, ordinances
and regulations with regard to police and public security."
It appears to the writer that the main questions re-
lating to the proper interpretation of the Treaty are the
first two as stated.
Should the courts decide that the action of the School
Board did violate the true intent and meaning of the
Treaty, they would be confronted with the further ques-
tion: Is the Treaty constitutional? If the treaty-
making power of the Federal Government is limited, and
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if this Treaty in conferring on Japanese residents in the
United States the right to attend the public schools of
a State exceeds those limits, the Treaty in this respect
is unconstitutional, and no more the supreme law of the
land than an unconstitutional act of Congress. The
question, "Can a Treaty override the Constitution?"
is to-day as absurd as the question, "Can an Act of
Congress override the Constitution?" The treaty-making
power, as the legislative power, must be exercised within
those limits, if any, imposed by the Constitution.
The difficulty is to determine the extent of the treaty-
making power. Is it an unlimited power or is it a limited
power; and, if limited, what are the limitations? On
the answers given to these questions depends the validity
of the Japanese Treaty, supposing that that Treaty does
in terms give the right to Japanese residents in this
country to send their children to the public schools of
the State in which they reside.
The discussion of the extent of the treaty-making
power is almost wholly an academic one, the Supreme
Court having only decided one point; namely, that the
treaty-making power of our Federal Government is not
confined within the limits of the legislative power of that
government. That can be done by treaty which cannot
be done by act of Congress.
Thus Chief Justice Marshall, in Chirac v. Chirac, as-
sumed that a treaty regulating the rights of foreigners
to inherit, purchase and hold lands in Maryland, was
constitutional, and superseded any Act of the State con-
flicting therewith. Indeed, the constitutionality of the
Treaty was, not questioned by council or court, the
argument and opinion being confined to its proper con-
struction. The same assumption had already been made
by Story. The case itself was several times confirmed
during the time of Marshall,1 while it has been ex-
xThe opinion of Judge Story is that given by him in Fairfax v.
Hunter's lessee, 7 Cranch's Reports, 603 (z813); Chirac v. Chirac is
reported in 2 Wheaton's Reports, 259 (1817). The other cases affirm-
ing Chirac v. Chirac in Marshall's time are Orr v. Hodgson, 4 Whea-
ton's Reports, 453 (18i9); Hughes v. Edwards, 9 ib. 489, 496 (1824);
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pressly followed in more recent years. That an Act of
Congress could not regulate the right of foreigners to
purchase and hold land in a State is beyond controversy.
The widest possible extension of the power of Congress
"to regulate commerce with foreign nations" would not
give to that body the power to pass such a law.
The conclusion reached from the cases referred to, that
under the treaty-making power that can be done which
Congress under its legislative power cannot do, is still
further strengthened by the long acquiescence of all
Departments of the Federal Government, and of the
states, in extradition treaties; treaties in which claims
of our citizens against foreign governments have been
confiscated, barred and satisfied; trade-mark conven-
tions; and treaties giving foreign consuls judicial powers
in the United States, or United States consuls judicial
power over American citizens in foreign lands. In all
these treaties will be found provisions which Congress
alone, under its legislative power, could not enact.2
On the other hand no memebr of the Supreme Court,
text writer, or publicist has yet taken the position that
the treaty-making power of our Federal Government is
absolutely unlimited.
The three main Articles of the Constitution deal re-
spectively with the legislative, executive and judicial
departments.. The clause conferring treaty-making
power is in the second Article. This Article provides that
the President "shall have power, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided
two thirds of the Senators present concur." The Con-
stitution does not specify the subjects in regard to which
treaties may be made. The words are general; the Presi-
dent and the Senate have the power to make treaties.
There is a marked difference in this respect in the manner
in which the second Article confers the treaty-making
and Carneal v. Banks, o ib. 1i (i82 5 ). The more modem case
confirming these cases is Hauenstein v. Lynham, zoo United States
Reports, 483 (1879). See also opinion of Mr. Justice Field in Geofroy
V. .1,ggS, 133 ib. 258, at page 266.
2Butler, Treaty-making Power, chapter ix.
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power and the way in which the first Article confers the
power of legislation. The first Article, after providing
for the creation of a legislative body, confers on that
body, hot the power to legislate, but the power to legis-
late on particular subjects which are carefully enumerated.
The powers conferred by the first Article are on their
face legislative powers only. They neither purport to
give nor take away any power which the President and
the Senate may possess in respect to treaties. This fact
is the justification for the decisions of the Supreme Court
to which reference has been made. Shortly after the
Constitution was adopted, when the Jay Treaty with
England was under discussion, it was supposed by some
that as the first Article conferred on Congress the power
to regulate foreign commerce, under the treaty-making
power no commercial treaty could be negotiated. It
was soon perceived, however, that regulations of foreign
commerce could be the result either of an act or a treaty,
and that while the first Article had conferred on Congress
legislative power which enabled them to regulate foreign
commerce, that did not prevent the treaty-maling power
from being so exercised as to produce the same result.
Since then the proposition that the treaty-making power
of our Federal Government is neither enlarged or con-
tracted by the grants of legislative power in the first
Article has never been seriously questioned. Taking
these first two Articles of the Constitution by themselves,
it is as clear that general treaty-making power is con
ferred in the second Article, as it is that limited legisla-
tive power is conferred in the first Article. If it be ob-
jected that the Constitution does not in express terms give
to the Federal Government power to make any treaty it
sees fit, it can be replied, that where those who are
sovereigns confer on their agents one of the great powers
of sovereignty, as the power of legislation or the power
to make a treaty, the word "all" is not necessary to
explain the extent of the power. The power to do some-
thing given by a sovereign hand is the power to do it in
any way the grantee sees fit. The argument that because
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the word "all" does not precede the word "power" in
the clause conferring treaty-making power and that there-
fore the power is limited, proves too much. It would
show that the words in the second Article do not confer
a power to make a treaty on any subject. Not only is
the word "all" not used, but none of the subjects on
which treaties may be negotiated are referred to.
As in apparently unambiguous language full and un-
limited treaty-making power is by the second Article
conferred on the President and the Senate, the burden
is on those who contend that the power is limited to prove
their case. For we must remember that if the Constitu-
tion does attempt to give to the President and Senate
an unlimited power to make treaties, the attempt has
been successful. There have been two theories in
regard to the adoption of the Constitution of the United
States; one that it was adopted by the people of the
United States; another that it was adopted by the states.
The advocates of either theory, however, agree that the
power which adopted the Constitution was competent
to confer on the government created by the Constitution
all the powers of sovereignty. The source from which
the Constitution sprang is a source of unlimited power
and authority. The people or the states who adopted
it could give to the new government that they created
just as -much or just as little of the powers of sovereignty
as they chose.
Limitations on the treaty-making power, if any exist,
may be found, either in the nature of the power, or the
words of the Constitution. Again, limitations may possi-
bly be implied from the fact that our Constitution was
adopted by a free people, or may be implied from the
very existence of the states as an intregal part of our
Federal State.
A moment's consideration will show that there is noth-
ing in the nature of the power which limits its operations
to particular classes of subjects. A treaty is a contract
between two nations. Treaties, if not essential to foreign
social and commercial intercourse, are at least an im-
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portant means of fostering such intercourse. The people
of a nation regulate their conduct towards each other
by those customs to which they have given the force of
law, and by legislation; but much of their conduct
towards the people of another nation must be regulated
by treaty. Thus, the binding rules of conduct of any
people spring from three sources, custom, legislation,
and treaties. There is nothing in the nature of any of
these sources of law which prevents any particular law
from having its origin in any one of them. The wisdom
of the contract expressed in the treaty is for the sovereign
nations who are parties to it to consider. Being sovereign,
the power to contract knows no legal limits. If, there-
fore, full and unlimited treaty-making power is given to
the Federal Government, by treaty anything can be done.
There is nothing in the nature of the power to limit the
subjects on which treaties can be made.
Though the treaty-making power is not limited by the
nature of the power, it is limited by the words of the
Constitution.
The. Constitution creates a government with three
Departments, the legislative, executive, and judicial,
and provides to a great extent for their organization.
It confers on each certain powers. It would seem almost
an axiom of Constitutional Law that no one of the powers
conferred can be so exercised as to alter the Constitution.
"A power given by the Constitution," says Judge
Story, "cannot be construed to authorize a destruction
of other powers given by the same instrument. * * *
A treaty to change the organization of the government
or annihilate its sovereignty, to overturn its republican
form or to deprive it of its constitutional powers, would
be void, because it would destroy what it was designed
to fulfill, the will of the people."' The treaty- making
power, as all other powers of our Federal Government,
is necessarily limited to the extent here indicated. By
treaty we may not alter the Constitutional distribution
of powers between the three Departments of our Federal
3 Story on the Constitution, section 15o8.
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Government, or confer on any Department a power not
conferred on it by the Constitution. By treaty we may
not agree that hereafter Congress should legislate on
divorce, or that the treaty-making power itself should
be executed by Congress; or that a particular State should
have three representatives in the Senate.
If a treaty cannot alter the Constitution as written,
a treaty cannot violate any specific general restriction
on Federal power which may be found in the Consti-
tution. The first eight Amendments, for instance, are
prohibitions against specific exercises of power. In all
.except the first, the prohibition is in terms general. The
second Amendment does not say that "Congress shall
not pass any law" forbidding the people to bear arms,
or that "the executive shall not interfere with this right,"
but that "the right of the people to keep and bear arms
shall not be infringed." A treaty which deprived the
people of this right would be apparently in direct viola-
tion of the express words of the Constitution.
It is, however, important to note that the ioth Amend-
ment does not limit the treaty-making power. This
Amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people." But the power to make treaties is
expressly given to the United States by the Constitution,
and the Constitution also expressly prohibits the States
from exercising the treaty-making power. The power
to make treaties, therefore, is not one of the powers
"reserved to the States respectively, or to the people,"
mentioned in this Amendment.
Again, it is important to note that the principle that
a treaty cannot alter the Constitution as written, cannot
be extended to prohibit treaties dealing with subjects.
not referred to in the Constitution. It may be that there
are limitations on the treaty-making power, arising out
of the fact that the Constitution was adopted by a free
people, or from the very existence of the states as a neces-
sary part of the Federal system. But such limitations,
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if they exist, do not come from the words of the Consti-
tution. For instance, it is admitted that a treaty which
conferred on Congress the right to regulate marriage and
divorce would be unconstitutional. But whether the
marriage of aliens in the United States could be regulated
by treaty is a radically different question. If the treaty-
making power cannot deal with the subject of the mar-
riage of aliens in the United States, it is not because of
anything expressed in our Constitution. The Constitu-
tion confers on Congress legislative power over certain
subjects. The marriage and divorce of natives or aliens
in a State of the United States is not a subject on which
Congress has been given power to legislate. To confer
such power on Congress by treaty would alter the Consti-
tution as written. But to regulate divorce by treaty
does not alter the Constitution as written. As has been
pointed out, the Constitution gives to the President and
the Senate the power to make treaties. It does not say
that the marriage and divorce of aliens in the United
States shall not be regulated by treaty. There is no
clause in the Constitution which such a treaty would
violate. To say that we have not given the power to
legislate on divorce to Congress and therefore that it
may be presumed that it was not intended to confer on
the President and Senate the power to regulate the sub-
ject by treaty, is to take the position that the grants of leg-
islative power limit the treaty-making power; a position
which has been, as we have seen, expressly repudiated by
the Supreme Court. If, therefore, there is no power to
make a treaty on the subject, the want of power must
be due, not to anything expressed in the Constitution, but
to some implied limitation on the treaty-making power.
The principles on which we would have to test the
validity of a treaty on the marriage and divorce of aliens
in the United States, also applies to the Treaty under
discussion. Admitting that our Treaty with Japan pro-
vides that Japanese residents shall have a right to at-
tend the public schools of a State, it is evident that such
treaty does not violate any clause of the Constitution as
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written. Such a treaty does not confer on Congress
legislative power over the State schools. It does not
increase or decrease legislative or executive power as
found in the Constitution or violate any of its express
prohibitions. The right of the -Federal Government to
adopt a treaty of the character indicated, can only be
denied by showing that such a treaty violates an implied
limitation on the treaty-making power.
The people of the United States are organized in a
Federal State. An implied limitation on a power dele-
gated to the Federal Government must arise out of the
existence of some implied reserved right in the people
of the United States, or out of the existence of some
implied reserved right in the states considered as cor-
porate entities.
We may first ask: Are there any implied reserved
rights of the people of the United States not mentioned
in the Constitution? Our Constitution was adopted by
a free people and was intended for their government.
The first eight Amendments specify certain rights of the
people of the United States. The rights specified tend
to protect individual liberty and the republican form of
government. Following these Amendments the 9 th
Amendment provides: "The enumeration in the Con-
stitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny
or disparage others retained by the people." The wording
of this Amendment presupposed the existence of reserved
rights in the people of the United States not mentioned
in the Constitution. There are, therefore, implied limi-
tations on the treaty-making power and on every other
power of the Federal Government arising out of the fact
that the Constitution was adopted by a free people im-
bued with the importance of individual liberty and firmly
believing in democratic institutions. It is unnecessary
to discuss specific illustrations of possible violations of
these implied limitations on the treaty-making power,
for a treaty which gives to aliens the right to attend the
public schools of a State does not violate any possible
rule of law designed to protect the liberty of the citizens
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of the United States or the republican form of govern-
ment.4
If the Treaty under discussion does not violate any
part of the Constitution as written, or any implied lini-
tation on the treaty-making power arising out of the
implied reserved rights of the citizens of the United
States, the single question remains: Does it violate any
implied limitation on the treaty-maling power arising
out of implied reserved rights of the States?
If the treaty-making power is necessarily limitpd by
the nature of a Federal State, then it will be neclssary
to go outside the Constitution to ascertain the nature
of those limitations, and whether they prohibit the
Central Government from making the treaty in question.
On the other hand if there is nothing in the nature of a
Federal State, in which the Central Government has all
the treaty-making power, to impose implied restrictions
4Mr. Justice White in his concurring opinion in Downs v. Bidwell,
.82 United States Reports, 244 (1goo), makes an elaborate investi-
gation of implied limitations on the treaty-making power arising
from the implied reserved rights of the citizens of the United Stas.
In the course of his interesting opinion he points out that, at the
adoption of the Constitution the United States consisted of a definite
number of persons inhabiting a definite territory, all of which terri-
tory was not included in the territory belonging to the original thir-
teen states. From this fact, coupled with the free character of our
institutions, he believes that the Federal Government is impliedly
restrained from parting with an inch of the territory of the United
States which was part of the United States at the adoption of the Con-
stitution or which has since been incorporated into the United States,
irrespective of whether such territory is or is not part of a State. He
also believes that while territory, and the people inhabiting it, can be
acquired by the United States by treaty, the treaty-making power
cannot be so used as to incorporate the acquired territory into the
United States, or make the inhabitants of such territory citizens of
the United States. If such incorporation of territory or naturaliza-
tion of citizens is to take place, the implied or express consent of
Congress must be obtained.
From this opinion two things are clear. First, the absence of power
in the Federal Government to cede any territory of the United States
is not ascribed by Mr. Justice White to the fact that we are a Federal
State. The same limitation on the power of our national government
would exist had we never had separate states, but as one people had
created a national government by the adoption of the Constitution.
Second, that there is nothing in Mr. Justice White's opinion inconsis-
tent with the power of the Federal Government by treaty to confer
on Japanese residents the right to attend the public schools of a state.
Such treaty does not make the Japanese citizens or confer on them
political rights, or incorporate territory into the United States.
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on the subjects which may be dealt with under that
power, such an investigation will be unnecessary.
The broad question whether any limitations on the
treaty-making power arise of necessity from the Federal
nature of our State has never been thoroughly discussed.
But the most important single question which tests the
question of the existence of such a limitation, the right
of our Federal Government by treaty to cede the terri-
tory of a State without its consent, has been the subject
of many positive and conflicting assertions. Chancellor
Kent in his Commentaries; Justice McLean in Lattimore
v. Poteet, and Mr. Butler in his work on the Treaty-
Making Power, are all of the opinion that such a power
exists. On the other hand, Woolsey in his work on In-
ternational Law, and the late Justice Field of the Supreme
Court, deny the power.5
The greater power includes the less. If it can be shown
that there is nothing in the nature of a Federal State to
prevent the treaty-making power from ceding part or
all of the territory of a State to a foreign power, there is
certainly nothing in the nature of such a State to prevent
the subjects of. a foreign power from being given by
sThe authorities spoken of in the text, as in favor of the power
are: Kent's Commentaries, vol. z, x67, note b; Lanimore v. Potni,
z4 Peter's Reports, 4 (1840), at pages i3, 14; Butler's Treaty-Making
Power in the United States, Chapter XVI. Those given as opposed
to the power are: Woblsey's Introduction to the Study of Interna-
tional Law, section 103, p. 161. Opinions of Mr. Justice Field in Fort
Leavenworth R. R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 United States Reports, at pages
540, 541; and in Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 ib, at page 267.
As has been pointed out in note 4, Mr. Justice White denies the
ower of the Federal Government to cede any territory of the United
States, but he does not take this position because of any reserved
right in the States.
It has been often asserted that Webster was of the opinion that
the Federal Government could not cede the territory of a State with-
out its consent. When questions arose over the northeastern bound-
ary in Maine between Great Britain and the United States, the Fed-
eral Government asked Maine and Massachusetts to appoint commis-
sioners to co-operate with the Federal Government, expressly stat-
ing that no treaty would be submitted to the Senate unless it received
the unanimous approval of the State Commissioners. Webster, at
the time Secretary of State, wrote the letters directed to the Goverhors
of Maine and Massachusetts, inviting them to appoint Commissioners.
In these letters he states that it is the duty of the Federal Government
not to take action without the consent of the two states whose rights
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treaty the right to attend the public schools of the State.
In the second case a State is merely required to devote
a part of its property, set aside for the education of native
residents, to the education of foreign residents; but in
the first the State itself is destroyed.
The sole force which creates confederacies is usually
pressure from abroad. The separate states realize that
as independent units they cannot continue to exist. A
Federal State owes its origin to this desire for protection
from foreign aggression on the part of the individual
states, plus a desire for untrammelled interstate inter
course. Thus in a Federal State, the necessity for pre-
senting a united front to foreign nations,while not the sole
is a prime cause of the very existence of the State itself.
The separate states of our union, for instance, could
not exist as separate nations. The weaker would become
the prey to the stronger, the strongest would be open to
foreign insult and aggression. This is true to-day; it
was true at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.
The people of South Carolina by entering the union, or
the people of California by being in the union, are much
more likely to be effectually protected from foreign in-
vasion or personal insult in their dealings with foreigners,
than if these states were sovereign and independent.
Protection from foreign aggression, therefore, was one
of the principle causes which led to the formation of our
union. And it has been asked: Is there not from this
fact an implied reservation on any power granted to the
Federal Government that it shall not be so used as to
destroy one of the very purposes for which the State
consented to join the Union? Others go further, and
say that as the regulation of a state's internal affairs by
are more immediately concerned. But the legal duty of the Federal
Government and the legal right of the States are not discussed by
Webster. In view of the then existing relations between the adminis-
tration and the Senate, it was important to secure the co-operation
of those states likely to be affected by the proposed boundary Treaty,
before actually negotiating such a treaty, if the Treaty when nego-
tiated was to receive the necessary two-thirds vote in the Senate.
The letters referred to will be found in Webster's Works, vol. VI,
pages 272, 273. See also Webster's defence of the Treaty, ib., vol.
V, page 98.
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the Federal Government was evidently not one of the
objects of the union, any power granted to the Federal
Government cannot be so exercised as to regulate what
is rather indefinitely called the "reserved police rights
of the States." 6 It is assumed that carefully limited
legislative power and largely unlimited treaty-making
power in the same government is an absurdity.
That our Constitution should carefully guard and limit
the legislative power of the Federal Government is most
natural. The regulation of interstate, not state com-
merce; protection to the United States as a nation, not
regulations of the internal affairs of the States, are ob-
jects of the union. General legislative power in the
Federal Government was unnecessary to accomplish the
ends in view. But the power to deal with foreign nations
as a unit; to secure as a unit in time of peace the best
commercial treaties possible; as a unit to make war, if
war was necessary; and as a unit to make the best peace
possible, if peace was necessary; all these were prime
objects of the union, and they are objects which cannot
be obtained by conferring a treaty-making power limited
and fettered in the way it was both wise and feasible that
the Federal legislative power should be fettered. Take
even the power to part by treaty with the territory of a
State. The probability that the new nation would sooner
or later be engaged in war was present to the minds of
those who adopted our Constitution. Wars are ended
by treaties of peace. The spectacle of a nation being
obliged to purchase peace by the cession of territory is
6The idea that the treaty-making power or any power delegated to
the United States cannot be exercised so as td regulate that which
the States may regulate under their reserved power was of course
often expressed in the ante bellum period. See opinion of Mr. Justice
Daniel in the License Cases, 5 Howard's Reports, 504 (1847) at page
613; the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Taney in the Passenger
Cases, 7 Howard's Reports, 283, (z849) at pages 465, 466. These
opinions reflect the ideas of Calhoun. See Calhoun's Works, edited
by Crald, vol. i, pages 454, 455. In our own day Mr. John Randolph
Tucker has expressed somewhat similar views. See Tucker on the
Constitution of the United States, vol. 2, section 354. These views
are directly contrary to the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall in Gib-
bons v. Ogden, 9 Wheaton's Reports, i, (x824) at page 204, and are
opposed to the current of modem authority.
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not rare. Before, as well as since, the adoption of our
Constitution, other nations have often had to purchase
peace by the cession of territory. Germany demanded
Alsace and Lorraine as the price of withdrawing their
troops from Paris. The experience of France is not
unique. Though we are now a powerful nation removed
probably for many decades to come from the fear of
foreign invasion, we have in the course of our short
history seen a foreign power in possession of our national
capitol. If by entering a union with other States, a State
renders it legally possible for the Central Government
to sacrifice her territory or her complete control over her
police arrangements to protect the territory of other
States, she also gains the reciprocal advantage of being
able to save herself and the great majority of the other
States by sacrificing the territory of a sister State. Such
an arrangement is not one-sided.
Take the specific case under consideration. The power
to admit or exclude aliens from the territory of a State
unquestionably resides in our Federal Government. The
Federal Government has the exclusive power of natu-
ralization. When the States have already given to the
Central Government the power to admit aliens and make
them citizens, entitled to all the rights and privileges of
citizenship, there is nothing unreasonable in their also
conferring on that government the power to give aliens,
after admission to a State and before naturalization, the
right to be admitted to her public schools.
To allow a bare majority of the Federal. Legislature to
make a treaty which might have these results would have
been unwise. Our Constitution has, therefore, required
that at least two thirds of the Senate present shall be
required to ratify a treaty. The Senate is that body
which primarily represents the States. Such a provision
has proved by experience an ample protection against
the unwarranted sacrifice by treaty of the interest of any
one State. To have required the unanimous consent of
the Senate would have rendered it practically impossi-
ble for any treaty to be negotiated.
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The fact that we are a Federal State, that we have
only conferred on our Federal Government limited legis-
lative power, that the cession of territory or the regula-
tion of the internal affairs of the States was not an object
for which our union was formed, or for which it exists,
does not lead to the conclusion that the treaty-making
power is impliedly limited by a rule which would prevent
either the cession of the territory of a State to a foreign
power, or an interference by treaty with the police powers
of the States. On the contrary, to impose implied limits
of this kind would seriously interfere with one of the
great objects of the union-the capacity to deal as one
people with foreign nations.
It is, of course, admitted that the mere fact that the
power claimed to exist in our Federal Government is
necessary to accomplish a principal object of the union,
is not a reason why we should assume that it has been
conferred. But where a power, as the treaty-making
power, has been in general terms conferred on the Federal
Government, to limit the power, not by any words in
the Constitution but by a limitation implied from the
supposed nature of our Federal State, it is necessary to
show affirmatively that the limitation proposed arises
from the very nature of the State itself. If this cannot
be done, but on the contrary an examination of the
forces creating our Federal State show that one of the
prime objects of our union would be defeated by the
proposed implied reservation, no such reservation may
be implied.
If these conclusions are correct, our Federal Govern-
ment has under the Constitution power to make a treaty
with Japan or any other foreign nation, giving to the
subjects or citizens of the foreign nation residing in one
of the States the right to attend the public schools of the
State on the same terms as native or naturalized citizens.
In the Constitution itself we find nothing to restrain the
President from negotiating, and two thirds of the Senate
from ratifying such a treaty. It is not opposed to the
fundamental characteristics of free republican govern-
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ment; it does not interfere with the liberty of the citizens
of the United States; and finally, there is nothing in the
nature of our Federal State from which we may imply
any limitation on the treaty-making power not found in
the words of the Constitution. Whether we have actually
made such a treaty with Japan is another question.
Whether, admitting that we have made such a treaty,
it was a proper or wise treaty to make is foreign to this
discussion.
A power may be abused by those who possess it, but
this in itself is no reason for denying the existence of the
power. The confusion which has existed on the subject
of the treaty-making power in our Constitution has
arisen largely through confusing the letter of the Constitu-
tion with the spirit which should aninte those respon-
sible for the conduct of our State and Federal Govern-
ments. There are many acts which our Federal or State
Governments may constitutionally do which would un-
questionably violate the spirit of the agreement which
makes us a nation. If the Federal Government should
arbitrarily barter away the territory of a State without
its consent, no one doubts that the State affected would
be morally justified in resisting the transfer by force.
But the possible arbitrary exercise of a power while it
may morally justify revolution, does not prove, or even
tend to show, that the power does not exist. There is
no proposition of our Constitutional law more firmly
established than this: Given a power in a Department
of the Federal Government, and that Department, not
the court, is the sole judge of the conditions under which
the power should be exercised. If by treaty we have
not power to adjust the boundary between the United
States and a foreign state, without the consent of the
particular State whose territory is affected, the possi-
bility of warding off a war by such an adjustment would
not legally justify making such a treaty without the
concurrence of the State. The recklessly selfish attitude
of the particular State involved would be no legal defense
for such a treaty. On the other hand, if the power exists,
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the President and Senate are the sole judges of the time
and manner in which it may be exercised.
There is a letter of the Constitution and a spirit of the
Constitution. The Courts have always recognized that
their concern is with the Constitution as written. If
this rule was broken and our judges permitted themselves
to wander into the uncertain realm of the spirit of the
Constitution we would soon have acts and treaties set
aside by Courts because the judges believed their provi-
sions were unnecessary.
The spirit of our Constitution is plain. It is that in
the exercise of what may be an undoubted power, the
members of the Federal or State Governments should
remember that the whole should as far as possible avoid
injuring a part, and that the part should as far as may be
avoid injuring the whole. The cultivation of such a
spirit is essential to our preservation as a Federal State.
But whether it is or is not violated by a particular act
or treaty is for the body which passes the one, or for the
President and Senate which negotiates and confirms' the
other, alone to decide.
Win. Draper Lewis.
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